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FEDERAL JURISDICTION
how is that cost to be measured? Without a guiding principle
consistently applied, no final answer can be expected. At any
given time, the balance will be struck wherever the nine Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court think it should be struck.
YERACHMIEL E. WEINSTEIN
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Ancillary Jurisdiction
-Independent Grounds of Jurisdiction Required for
Plaintiff's Claim against Third Party Defendant. Owen
Equipment &'Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
Within the last fifty years, and especially since the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction has been greatly expanded by the inferior federal
courts. Importantly, this evolution has occurred in the absence
of specific direction from the United States Supreme Court.
Indeed, prior to the recent decision of Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,I the Court had last directly addressed
a question regarding the permissible scope of ancillary jurisdic-
tion2 in 1926 in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.3 Owen's
primary significance is that it (1) directs that jurisdictional
statutes be interpreted narrowly and (2) delineates a rather
ambiguous three part test in cases involving questions of ancil-
lary jurisdiction.4 While a possible interpretation of Owen is
that two of the factors involved in this latter test-logical de-
pendence of the federal and nonfederal claims5 and the loss of
a party's legal rights-are to be required only of plaintiffs, in
the author's judgment the better view is that either factor
should be required of any party to a lawsuit asserting a claim
requiring ancillary or pendent jurisdiction.6 Although the full
1. 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
2. This statement follows the distinction between ancillary, pendent and pendent
party jurisdiction which has been developed by the inferior federal courts. Owen,
however, makes fairly clear that there are no "principled" differences between the
three doctrines. Thus, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent
jurisdiction), and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (pendent party jurisdiction),
may properly be viewed as addressing the question of ancillary jurisdiction. Neverthe-
less, Owen is the most comprehensive pronouncement on the matter to date.
3. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
4. See text accompanying notes 23-39 infra.
5. A nonfederal claim is one as to which there are no independent grounds of
jurisdiction. A federal claim has such grounds.
6. See text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
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import of Owen must await judicial construction, the decision
provides the basis for a new and restrictive approach to this
area of jurisdictional law.
I. PRIOR LAW
Before addressing the decision itself, it may be helpful to
briefly review the general doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as
it existed before Owen. Ancillary jurisdiction was first recog-
nized in the case of Freeman v. Howe7 which held that federal
courts have jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to the own-
ership of property drawn into their control by a principal claim
falling within the court's jurisdiction. As late as 1925 the gen-
eral rule was that "no controversy can be regarded as . . .
ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets ac-
tually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or
control by the principal suit."'8
In 1926, in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,' the doc-
trine of ancillary jurisdiction was expanded to include compul-
sory counterclaims, but the Court gave little explanation of the
reasons for such expansion. Use of ancillary jurisdiction was
further extended after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. While the Rules did not expand subject mat-
ter jurisdiction,' 0 their liberal provisions for claim and party
joinder, at the very least, broadened the opportunities avail-
able for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction."
Following Moore and the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the federal courts generally held that a district
court acquires jurisdiction of a case in its entirety and, as an
incident to the disposition of a matter properly before it, can
decide other matters raised by the case over which there are no
independent grounds of jurisdiction.'2 This position followed
7. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
8. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925). See also Wabash R.R. v.
Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 (1908); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164 (1893); Krippendorf v.
Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884). Cf. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
9. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 82; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1969); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941).
11. See generally Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 395, 415-21 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370, 373-74 (9th
Cir. 1956); Williams v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 699
(1942); Crum v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 29 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D. W. Va. 1939).
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from the premise that a claim, under the Federal Rules, de-
notes "the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right
enforceable in the courts."' 3 Thus, once a court had acquired
jurisdiction over a core of facts, it could dispose of any claims
arising out of that core.'4
In 1966 the Supreme Court decided United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs'5 which involved a question of pendent jurisdiction.
Pendent jurisdiction concerns the resolution of a plaintiffs fed-
eral and state law claims against a single defendant in one
action.'6 In Gibbs, it was held that a federal court has power
to adjudicate pendent claims if "the relationship between that
[federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but one consti-
tutional 'case.' "' Under Gibbs, it is necessary that both the
federal and nonfederal claims derive from a "common nucleus
of operative fact.""' Thus, it is readily apparent that the Gibbs
test is quite similar to the principles of ancillary jurisdiction
which had been developed by the inferior federal courts.
I1. THE Owen DECISION
Owen, a wrongful death action, arose when James Kroger
was electrocuted in an accident involving a crane coming into
contact with power lines. Mrs. Kroger, an Iowa citizen, brought
a diversity action against the Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD), a Nebraska corporation. After Owen Equipment and
Erection Company (Owen) was impleaded by OPPD, Mrs.
Kroger amended her complaint to assert a direct claim against
Owen. Owen, in its answer, admitted that it was a Nebraska
corporation. After OPPD was dropped from the suit, the action
13. Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.
1943).
14. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1970); LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Soc. Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143
(6th Cir. 1969); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
15. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Prior to Gibbs, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction de-
pended on whether the state and federal law claims were "two distinct grounds in
support of a single cause of action," rather than "two separate and distinct causes of
action." Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933). This test was rejected by Gibbs,
383 U.S. at 725, as "unnecessarily grudging" under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
16. 98 S. Ct. at 2401.
17. 383 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. Under Gibbs, if this requirement is met, the court then has "power" to hear
the whole case; but the exercise of this power depends upon "considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Id. at 726.
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proceeded between Mrs. Kroger and Owen, jurisdiction resting
on diversity of citizenship. On the third day of trial, some two
years after Mrs. Kroger had amended her complaint to assert
a claim against Owen, the company challenged the court's ju-
risdiction, contending that diversity of citizenship was lacking
inasmuch as it was an Iowa corporation. Importantly, Owen
did not raise the jurisdictional defect until the Iowa statute of
limitations had run."9 The district court held that the claim was
within its ancillary jurisdiction." The court of appeals, relying
on Gibbs, affirmed.2 ' In reversing, the Supreme Court held that
independent grounds of jurisdiction are necessary before a
plaintiff may assert a claim against a third party defendant. 2
In reaching this conclusion, the Court seems to propound the
three part test discussed below.
A. Gibbs: Constitutional Limitations
Owen first addressed the issue of whether the Gibbs doc-
trine is applicable in cases involving ancillary jurisdiction. Al-
though a factual distinction between pendent and ancillary
claims is noted, the Court indicated that the distinction bears
no determinative weight.? While this position would appear to
be in accord with the reasoning of the court of appeals, the
majority indicated that the appellate court had not understood
the scope of the Gibbs doctrine. Properly read, "Gibbs deline-
ated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power."24 In
effect, the Court is stating that the Gibbs doctrine is applicable
in cases involving questions of ancillary jurisdiction, but that
Gibbs is only the first step in determining whether ancillary
jurisdiction is available.
B. Step Two: Statutory Limitations
Relying on two recent decisions, 25 the Court noted that
Gibbs "does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court
has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the federal
19. For a more complete statement of facts, see the opinion of the court of appeals,
558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
20. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erec. Co., No. - (D. Neb. 1976).
21. 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
23. Id. at 2401.
24. Id.
25. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973).
[Vol. 62:89
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
ones, '2 6 since "the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited
not only by . . .the Constitution, but [also] by Acts of Con-
gress. '
27
Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an ex-
amination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is
asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction
over the federal claim, in order to determine whether
"Congress in [that statute] has. . . expressly or by implica-
tion negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular
nonfederal claim.28
Since Strawbridge v. Curtis, 9 the diversity jurisdiction
statute, now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 3 has consistently
been interpreted as requiring complete diversity of citizen-
ship.3' Relying on this judicial construction and on the legisla-
tive history subsequent to its initial enactment, the Court re-
emphasized that "diversity jurisdiction is not to be available
when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any de-
fendant. ' 32 The majority expressly disapproved of the tactic by
which a plaintiff uses ancillary jurisdiction to "defeat the
statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple ex-
pedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse
citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse
defendants. '3
C. The Ambiguous Third Step: Logical Dependence,
Loss of Legal Rights and/or Claimant's Posture?
The final, and perhaps most important, part of the Court's
opinion involves the context in, or posture from which the non-
federal claim is asserted. The Court recognized three grounds
which can justify ancillary jurisdiction despite some restrictive
statutory language: (1) if there is a logical dependence between
the federal and nonfederal claims, (2) if "a defending party
[is] haled into court against his will" or (3) if the situation
26. 98 S. Ct. at 2402.
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 18).
29. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
30. (1976). See note 131 infra.
31. See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Indianapolis v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172
(1870). But it is settled that complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
32. 98 S. Ct. at 2403. The Court noted that Congress has re-enacted the statute a
number of times without altering the diversity requirement.
33. Id.
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involves the potential irretrievable loss of legal rights.34
The second factor, the claimant's position in the lawsuit, is
perhaps dispositive. In the Court's view, a plaintiff who sues a
third party defendant has the option of suing in either a state
or federal court, whereas "ancillary jurisdiction typically in-
volves claims by a defending party haled into court against his
will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably
lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a fed-
eral court." While the complete import of this statement is
not certain, it is clear that the Court is of the opinion that, at
least in a case such as this, there can be no room for complaint
since " '[T]he efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available
without question in the state courts.' ,,31
The Court also distinguished a plaintiffs ancillary claim
from a third party claim in that "A third-party complaint de-
pends at least in part upon the resolution of the primary law-
suit. . . . Its relation to the original complaint is thus not mere
factual similarity but logical dependence. '3 7 Since respond-
ent's claim did not depend upon the resolution of the principal
claim, it was "[f]ar from being an ancillary and dependent
claim," but was rather "a new and independent one.1131
Thus, the Court raised the logical dependence factor in the
third part of its test, but problematically, this factor was only
raised as an adjunct to the discussion distinguishing a plain-
tiff's claim from a third party claim. Nevertheless, in this au-
thor's view, this requirement of logical dependence marks the
introduction of a new and restrictive element in the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction. Federal courts had previously exer-
cised jurisdiction if the nonfederal claim was logically related
to the principal claim or if the claims arose from the same core
of facts. The majority's requirement of logical dependence is
distinguishable, seemingly referring to the nonfederal claim's
relationship to the resolution of the principal claim rather than
to its relationship to the transaction before the court.
Clearly, the Owen Court does not construe the diversity
statute as an absolute prohibition. A third factor, the need to
34. Id. at 2404.
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Id. (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir.
1972).
37. 98 S. Ct. at 2404. While this is the case in irnpleader, it is not, in fact, the
situation in all third party complaints.
38. Id.
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protect legal rights, is also raised as a possible basis of ancillary
jurisdiction if the first two parts of the Owen test are met:
It is not unreasonable to assume that, in generally requir-
ing complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the
jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable
to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logi-
cally entwined lawsuit. Those practical needs are the basis of
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 9
This latter part of the opinion leaves a number of questions
unresolved. Does the Court mean to say that all nonfederal
claims asserted by defendants which have met the Gibbs test
are within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court, regard-
less of the logical dependence or legal necessity requirements?
In other words, are the first and third factors listed above,
which both present very rigid and strict tests, to be employed
only in cases where the nonfederal claim is asserted by plain-
tiff, or should they be applicable to both plaintiff's and de-
fendant's claims, with, perhaps, a relaxed logical dependence
requirement in the latter situation? Finally, what is the rela-
tion of the third step of the Owen test to the second; are there
some cases where these latter factors are not to be considered
and the statutory negation of jurisdiction will be dispositive?"
In the author's view, any distinction between plaintiff's and
defendant's claims is largely artificial. Revere Copper & Brass
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," attempted to distinguish
a third party defendant's claim from that of a plaintiff's:
Suffice it to say that the two situations are the converse of
each other only superficially and that there are differences
which militate against identical treatment. First of all, the
plaintiff has the option of selecting the forum where he be-
lieves he can most effectively assert his claims, he has not
been involuntarily brought to a forum, faced with the pros-
pect of defending himself as best he can. . . . Since a plain-
tiff could not intially join a non-diverse defendant, it is argu-
able he should not be allowed to do so indirectly. . . . More-
over, there is the possibility . . . of collusion between the
plaintiff and an overly cooperative defendant .... 12
These distinctions are not convincing. First, plaintiff has no
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying note 124 infra.
41. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 716.
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choice or control over the impleader; he has only an initial
choice of forum. Once the third party defendant is impleaded,
plaintiff is, in effect, involuntarily made a party to a new type
of action-one which he may not have contemplated. More-
over, even if the impleader is foreseeable, foreseeability alone
should not "be a sufficient reason to declare that a district
court does not have the power to exercise ancillary jurisdic-
tion."43 Indeed, it has previously been held that the actions or
consent of a party do not affect jurisdiction;" there is no reason
why foreseeability should stand on a different footing.
On the other hand, a defendant's ability to defend "himself
as best he can" is not enhanced by exercising jurisdiction over
his nonfederal claim for personal injuries. Except for im-
pleader, a defendant's claims are offensive in nature and are
not related to his ability to defend himself.4" Similarly, it is not
clear why the plaintiff, who is after all, the allegedly aggrieved
party, should be penalized either for choosing a federal forum
or for responding to a change in the nature of the action result-
ing from the defendant's impleader of an additional party.
Also, indirection should be irrelevant since plaintiff has not
caused it and indirection results in all cases where ancillary
jurisdiction is invoked. Finally, as the dissent in Owen argued,
collusion can adequately be handled under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.41
Thus, it would seem that any distinctions between plaintiff's
and defendant's posture in a lawsuit are insufficient to warrant
affording them different rights.
Indeed, if ancillary jurisdiction is to be restricted, the re-
quirements of logical dependence or loss of legal rights are more
logical means of restriction. Traditionally, the doctrine of an-
cillary jurisdiction was invoked in cases such as Freeman v.
Howe,4 7 where legal rights would otherwise be lost. In Moore v.
New York Cotton Exchange8 the doctrine was expanded to
include compulsory counterclaims, but, as the particular claim
in Moore probably satisfied the logical dependence test, the
43. 98 S. Ct. at 2408 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
44. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) (cited by the
Owen majority).
45. The most convincing justification for a preferential jurisdictional rule would
seem to be that such a rule is necessary to safeguard the interests of a defending party.
However, the availability of impleader would seem to afford a defendant adequate
protection, thus eliminating the need for any special jurisdictional treatment.
46. (1976). See note 65 infra.
47. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
48. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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decision should not be read as a blanket approval of all claims
by defendants which arise from the same transaction. Indeed,
Moore is cited by Owen in support of the logical dependence
proposition.4 While the inferior federal courts gave Moore a
broad and liberal interpretation and developed a test virtually
identical to the Gibbs doctrine, Supreme Court precedents re-
flect a view of ancillary jurisdiction which is considerably more
narrow.50 The better argument, then, supports the uniform
application of the logical dependence or protection of legal
rights requirements regardless of the claimant's status.5'
III. INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE OF Owen IN DIVERSrrY CASES
Depending on the interpretation given the third part of the
Owen test, the decision could have a major impact on modem
notions of ancillary, pendent and pendent party jurisdiction.
While the decision is in accord with the majority federal court
view in a Rule 1452 context, its rationale diverges sharply from
49. 98 S. Ct. at 2404.
50. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have successively adopted a narrower
view of ancillary jurisdiction. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-
01 (1973), the Court refused to extend ancillary jurisdiction to plaintiffs in a FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class action who failed to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The decision was reached in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had previously
held that intervention by a member of a class was within the ancillary jurisdiction of
a federal court. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Stewart
v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
Three years after Zahn, the Court decided Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
In that case, the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction was severely restricted, if not
wholly abrogated. In so doing, the Court diverged from the majority federal court view
(see, e.g., Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Almenares v.
Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971)) and established an entirely new test in pendent
party cases.
Owen has now extended the Aldinger test to cases of ancillary jurisdiction, and, like
its predecessors, has adopted a policy of strict statutory compliance. Unmistakably,
the trend has been to restrict the availability of ancillary jurisdiction and to limit the
conclusiveness of Gibbs.
51. The argument can also be made that the Court did not intend to alter the
traditional majority position that nonfederal claims asserted by defendants (which
have first met the Gibbs test) are within a court's ancillary jurisdiction. First, there is
language in Owen which appears to approve this view. 98 S. Ct. at 2404. Secondly, the
majority notes that ancillary jurisdiction "has been said to include cases that involve
multiparty practice." Id. at n.18. It was the opinion of the dissent in Owen that this
language was recognition of ancillary jurisdiction in the impleader, cross-claim and
counterclaim contexts. Id. at 2406 (White, J., dissenting). Finally, it can be argued
that if the Supreme Court had meant to overturn the law as developed by the inferior
federal courts it would have done so in an unequivocal manner. It may be, then, that
Owen has not propounded a new rule in cases where the nonfederal claim is asserted
by a defendant.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
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these decisions. Certainly, a significant change is the strict,
almost unyielding construction given the diversity statute it-
self.
Although it has been held that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) 3
requires complete diversity and must be strictly construed, "
the Court here seems to require stricter adherence to the letter
of the statute than had previously been thought necessary. The
requirement of complete diversity is interpreted so strictly in
this case that it is not circumvented (1) by indirection,55 (2) by
the fact that the claims derive from a common nucleus of fact,5
(3) by the fact that Owen's negligence will be before the court
in either case, 7 (4) by the fact that plaintiff will be inconven-
ienced and the burden on the judiciary as a whole increased or
(5) by the fact that such a strict construction could lead to a
harsh and inequitable result.58
Diversity and ancillary jurisdiction are in fact opposite
sides of the same coin; to expand the complete diversity re-
quirement is to necessarily limit the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction.59 The next section of this note will examine the impact
of Owen on ancillary claims against nondiverse parties given
this relation. In this examination, it will be assumed that the
federal and nonfederal claims derive from a "common nucleus
of operative fact." Since Owen has now very strictly construed
the diversity statute, the second part of the test need not be
addressed. The key question, then, is how the third step of the
Owen test will be employed in a variety of situations.
A. Plaintiff v. Third Party Defendant
Prior to Owen, the majority of federal courts refused to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction when faced with a plaintiff's
claim against a third party defendant." Generally, they distin-
53. (1976).
54. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270
(1934). See also cases cited note 31 supra.
55. 98 S. Ct. at 2403.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2407 (White, J., dissenting).
58. In this instance, the Iowa statute of limitations had run, perhaps leaving plain-
tiff with no alternate forum. Id. at 2404 n.20.
59. See id. at 2406.
60. See, e.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v.
Better Materials Corp., 556 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d
325 (6th Cir. 1976); Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975);
Friend v. Middle Atl. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946).
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guished Gibbs and held that it is not enough that the federal
and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of opera-
tive fact""1 in the instance of a plaintiff's claim because a plain-
tiff should not be allowed to do indirectly that which he cannot
do directly-obtain jurisdiction over a party who would not
otherwise be within the court's reach. 2
The minority view63 followed the reasoning of Professor
Moore and allowed ancillary jurisdiction for plaintiff's claims.
Moore had argued that Gibbs "re-emphasizes the fundamental
principle that a federal court has jurisdictional power to adju-
dicate the whole case."" He severely criticized a restricted view
because: (1) it is irrelevant that plaintiff could not have sued
the third party defendant directly since he has no control over
the impleader, (2) collusion can effectively be handled under
28 U.S.C. § 13595 and (3) a fear of collusion does not justify
an absolute prohibition.66
Owen apparently resolves the question of whether inde-
pendent grounds of jurisdiction are necessary to support a
plaintiffs claim against a third party defendant where the fed-
eral claim is based on diversity of citizenship. However, even
under the decision's restrictive test, the result in this instance
can be questioned.
It will be recalled that Owen concealed its true citizenship
until after the Iowa statute of limitations had expired. Re-
spondent, who had no reason to disbelieve petitioner's false
admissions, was deceived into proceeding in a federal court to
her possible detriment. In effect, a federal court and its proce-
dural system may have been used as an instrument in the
destruction of an innocent plaintiff's legal rights. Iowa does
have a saving clause in its statute of limitations," however, and
61. See, e.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1972).
63. See, e.g., Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erec. Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977),
reu'd, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978); Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.
Miss. 1976); CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
64. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.27[1], at 14-569 (2d ed. 1978) (emphasis in
original).
65. (1976). This section prohibits district court jurisdiction over parties collusively
joined to invoke jurisdiction.
66. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.27[1], at 14-570 to 14-571 (1978); 6 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE: CIVM § 1444, at 230-32 (1971 &
Supp. 1977).
67. This provision reads: "If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff,
for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, fails therein, and a new one is
1978]
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the language of both the majority" and the dissent 9 suggest
that the justices believed that, despite a dismissal in federal
court, Mrs. Kroger would be able to pursue her claim against
Owen in the Iowa courts. Thus, Owen leaves unanswered the
question whether ancillary jurisdiction can be exercised in a
case where a plaintiff's rights would definitely be lost through
no negligence on his or her part.
B. Third Party Defendant v. Plaintiff
The federal courts have split on the issue whether inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds are necessary for a claim by a
third party defendant against a plaintiff. The modem trend
has allowed ancillary jurisdiction," reasoning that there is little
chance of collusion and the posture in which a third party
defendant's claim is asserted is sufficiently different from that
in which a plaintiff's claim is made to require different treat-
ment.1
Clearly, if legal rights would be lost or the nonfederal claim
is- logically dependent upon the principal claim, ancillary juris-
diction may be exercised. The difficulty lies with the Court's
statement that "ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims
by a defending party haled into court against his will .... ,,72
While it can be argued that ancillary jurisdiction should not be
predicated upon whether the claimant is plaintiff or defendant,
or that such a test is illogical and inconsistent with that of
logical dependence, the Court does, nevertheless, include this
language in its discussion of the third step. This may be
deemed as sufficient approval for the inferior courts to perpetu-
ate the majority view.
Although Owen may not cause any change in the Rule 14
context herein discussed, the illogicality of basing ancillary
jurisdiction on a claimant's status is best demonstrated under
brought within six months thereafter, the second shall, for the purposes herein contem-
plated, be held a continuation of the first." IowA CODE ANN. § 614.10 (West 1950).
68. 98 S. Ct. at 2404 n.20.
69. Id. at 2407 (White, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d
763, 772 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Revere Copper & Brass
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 713-15 (5th Cir. 1970); Finkel v. United
States, 385 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486, 487-89 (D. Neb. 1965).
71. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1970).
72. 98 S. Ct. at 2404.
[Vol. 62:89
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
this rule. Assume, for example, that A, B and C-citizens of
states X, Y and X respectively-are involved in a three car
collision. A sues B in diversity and B impleads C for contribu-
tion. C, who has also been injured, claims against A pursuant
to Rule 14; A raises the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence and also asserts a claim against C for his own inju-
ries. All of the claims here satisfy the Gibbs test, but A and C
are nondiverse parties. If the test of "context" be whether the
claimant "has been haled into court against his will," then C's
claim against A will be ancillary, but A's claim against C will
not, since A "has chosen the federal rather than the state forum
and must thus accept its limitations. 7 3
Under the logical dependence test, however, C's claim
against A for his own injuries would be new and independent
and in no way necessary to protect his legal rights which are
amply safeguarded by the availability of impleader. If the for-
mer of the two tests is adopted, it is manifest that jurisdiction
over C's claim will not be founded on his need to defend him-
self, since his claim is for his own injuries. In effect, then, the
ancillarity of C's claim will be based on considerations of con-
venience and economy. This is nothing more than the Gibbs
doctrine, which Owen found not to be peremptory. The argu-
ment would seem to be quite strong, then, that at least in such
a context, different rules should not apply merely because the
nonfederal claim is asserted by a defendant rather than by a
plaintiff who has a choice of forum.
C. Impleader
Since the 1948 amendment to Rule 14, there has been little
doubt that a defendant's claim against a third party defendant
falls within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court. 4 Owen
expressly approved of this practice.
A number of federal courts have also held that Federal Rule
18(a)71 should be read in conjunction with Rule 14(a) to permit
73. Id. The absurdity of this result is further illustrated by the fact that C's negli-
gence will be determined in either instance and A may assert the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, but will not be permitted to recover any damages from C. It can
certainly be argued that questions of jurisdiction should not be resolved by an arbitrary
test which leads to such an illogical result.
74. See, e.g., H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967);
Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). This rule provides that a party may join as many claims
as he has with his third party claim against an opposing party.
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the defendant to join a personal claim with his impleader
claim. 7 Such claims, when procedurally permissible, have
sometimes been held to be ancillary if they are logically related
to the core of facts from which the principal claim derives. 7
The propriety of exercising ancillary jurisdiction in such cases
is questionable after Owen. A Rule 18(a) claim, since it is gen-
erally asserted for personal injuries, apparently is "[flar from
being an ancillary and dependent claim" but is rather a "new
and independent one."7 8
D. Counterclaims79
The applicability of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to
compulsory counterclaims' has not been questioned since
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.8 1 Owen will probably
have no effect on this practice. Owen does, however, suggest
that the traditional rationale for asserting ancillary jurisdiction
in such cases is somewhat inaccurate. The federal courts have
generally held that "the issue of the existence of ancillary juris-
diction and the issue as to whether a counterclaim is compul-
sory are to be answered by the same test. 82 Moore established
76. See, e.g., Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 71 (3d Cir. 1971). But
see C.W. Humphrey Co. v. Security Aluminum Co., 31 F.R.D. 41, 44 (E.D. Mich.
1962); United States v. Scott, 18 F.R.D. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
77. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir.
1975) (ancillary jurisdiction denied on the facts); United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co.,
472 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1973) (ancillary jurisdiction denied on the facts); Schwab
v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 71 (3d Cir. 1971). Contra, Schwab v. Erie
Lackawanna R.R., 48 F.R.D. 442, 444 (W.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd, 438 F.2d 62, 71 (3d Cir.
1971); Gebhardt v. Edgar, 251 F. Supp. 678, 681 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
78. 98 S. Ct. dt 2404. It should also be noted, in reference to the Court's statement
that ancillary jurisdiction typically extends to claims made by a defending party, that
in such a case the personal claim is being asserted by a defendant against a new
defendant who has also been "haled into court against his will." It is not a claim which
is made against the plaintiff.
79. In the context of counterclaims the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is of pri-
mary importance where the principal claim is based on a federal question. E.g., Great
Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961). It is also
applicable in diversity actions where the counterclaim fails to meet the amount in
controversy requirement. E.g., Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141
(1904). No problems, of course, are presented in diversity actions where the amount
in controversy requirement is met.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
81. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
82. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir.
1961), where it was held that a "counterclaim is compulsory if it bears a 'logical
relationship' to an opposing party's claim." Id. at 634. It should be noted that
"transaction or occurrence," "core of operative fact" and "common nucleus of opera-
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the transactional test for determining whether a counterclaim
was compulsory indicating that "'[t]ransaction' is a word of
flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occur-
rences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of
their connection as upon their logical relationship."' However,
'the federal courts also adopted this test as the test for deter-
mining whether a claim is ancillary,84 despite the fact that the
only statement in Moore going to jurisdiction clearly requires
more than a mere logical transactional relationship. 88 In fact,
Moore was cited by the Owen Court in support of the logical
dependence requirement.8 7 Thus, the earlier federal court inter-
pretation appears to have been too liberal.
While it is conceivable that some compulsory counterclaims
may not satisfy the logical dependence requirement, it seems
unlikely that any change in the traditional practice will fol-
low.88 Permissive counterclaims89 will continue to require inde-
pendent grounds of jurisdiction under the Owen test.90 This is
so since a permissive counterclaim, by definition, does not arise
from the "common nucleus of operative fact" and is thus out-
side the limits of constitutional power.
tive fact" are virtually synonymous. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 713-15 (5th Cir. 1970).
83. 270 U.S. at 610.
84. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709,
714 (5th Cir. 1970).
85. So close is the connection between the case sought to be stated in the
bill and that set up in the counterclaim, that it only needs the failure of the
former to establish a foundation for the latter; but the relief afforded by the
dismissal of the bill is not complete without an injunction ....
270 U.S. at 610.
86. See H.L. Petersen Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
87. 98 S. Ct. at 2404.
88. It could be argued that compulsory counterclaims are ancillary since they are
forfeited if not asserted. See American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360
(1922). But this rationale is weak. Assuming that compulsory counterclaims are not
within a court's ancillary jurisdiction, a forfeiture would be a denial of "due process."
This, then, cannot be the basis for exercising ancillary jurisdiction.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) reads: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
90. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th
Cir. 1970). A permissive counterclaim in the nature of a setoff has been held to be an
exception to the general rule. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Ralston Steel Corp.,
25 F.R.D. 23, 26 (N.D. Ill. 1959). Owen may also have an effect on this practice.
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E. Crossclaims
Crossclaims" have consistently been held to be within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts.92 The test for deter-
mining whether a crossclaim exists has been held to be the
same as the test for determining whether a crossclaim is ancil-
lary. 3 Owen may call for a review of this practice since it is now
clear that a finding that the claims derive from a "common
nucleus of operative fact" does not end the inquiry into
whether ancillary jurisdiction exists.
Certainly, where the court has gained control over property
or a fund,9" a crossclaim as to ownership will be regarded as
ancillary. 5 But it apparently will not be enough that the
crossclaim merely relates to property in the court's control.
The crossclaim may now have to affect, or be necessary to a
complete determination of, the principal claim.9 7 This would
mark a return to the narrow view of ancillary jurisdiction recog-
nized in Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux.9"
Crossclaims for indemnity, contribution or subrogation will
continue to be ancillary under the new rule.99 Other types of
crossclaims, which merely bear a transactional relationship to
the principal claim, may not be ancillary under the principles
propounded in Owen. The fact that such a claim is asserted by
a defendant should not be sufficient to circumvent the Court's
strict construction of the diversity statute since the claim is
being asserted against a codefendant who has also been "haled
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
92. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Soc. Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1969); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370,
373 (9th Cir. 1956). But see FED. R. Civ. P. Form 20 (suggesting that independent
grounds may be required).
93. Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1966); Collier v. Harvey, 179 F.2d
664, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1949).
94. See, e.g., Atlantic Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 907, 910 (lst Cir. 1962);
R.M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
96. Cases like Coastal Air Lines v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1950), where
an action was brought to determine rights to insurance funds and a crossclaim for rent
due was held to be ancillary because it arose out of the same transaction as the
principal claim, will be questionable under the Owen test.
97. See Pettyjohn v. Pettyjohn, 192 F.2d 322, 326 (8th Cir. 1951).
98. 218 U.S. 258 (1910). Rickey involved a dispute as to prior right to river water
amongst riparian owners. The crossclaim there was held within the court's ancillary
jurisdiction since "a decree as between themselves and other defendants would be
necessary in order to prevent a decree for . [plaintiff] from working injustice." Id.
at 263.
99. See, e.g., Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 1957).
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into court against his will" and not against a plaintiff. In such
a case a crossclaimant is, in effect, a plaintiff who is asserting
a new and independent claim. The federal courts, however,
may be hesitant to modify a rule which has been so firmly
established.
F. Additional Parties Under Rule 13(h)"'0
Federal Rule 13(h) provides for the joinder of additional
parties to counterclaims or crossclaims in accordance with
Rules 19 and 20.101 The federal courts have generally applied
the same rules of ancillary jurisdiction as have been applied in
the counterclaim and crossclaim contexts. Thus, Rule 13(h)
crossclaims'02 and compulsory counterclaims' have been held
to be ancillary, whereas permissive counterclaims have not.04
Even if the third step of the Owen test is whether or not the
claimant has been "haled into court against his will," there
seem to be considerations which militate against pendent party
jurisdiction under Rule 13(h).
First, an additional party under Rule 13(h) is one who
would not otherwise be in court. Second, a 13(h) claim's only
relation to the federal claim is that it arises out of a common
nucleus of operative fact; it is not defensive but is rather as-
serted by a defendant to recover for his own injuries. Last, such
a claim is not made against a plaintiff who has a choice of
forum, but against a new party who is joined unwillingly. Thus,
it can be argued that a Rule 13(h) claim should also meet the
requirement of logical dependence in order to be ancillary.
G. Intervention
As with counterclaims, the applicability of ancillary juris-
diction to intervention has depended on whether it is classified
as permissive or of right. 105 Permissive intervention has tradi-
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h)..
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20. Whether an additional party is classified as a Rule 19
or Rule 20 party seems irrelevant, since the new party will be permissive, one who
should be joined or indispensable with regard to the crossclaim or counterclaim-not
to the principal (federal) claim. See Value Line Fund Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp. 533
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
102. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Soc. Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1969).
103. See, e.g., H.L. Petersen Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
104. See, e.g., Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th
Cir. 1964).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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tionally been held to require independent grounds of jurisdic-
tion."'6 The Court's decision certainly affirms this practice.
However, class actions may be one exception to the rule
that independent grounds of jurisdiction are required for per-
missive intervention. Since 1885, it has been held that inter-
vention by a member of a class is within a federal court's ancil-
lary jurisdiction since such an absentee is bound by the judg-
ment and thus it is "merely a matter of form whether the new
parties should come in as co-complainants."' 17 This practice
has been followed in subsequent cases0 8 and Owen should not
have any effect.
Generally an independent basis of jurisdiction has not been
required if intervention is of right.0 9 The doctrine is properly
invoked in such cases since the intervenor "claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may . . . impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest." 0 Indeed, it would be inequitable to exclude the in-
tervenor merely because he is of the wrong citizenship and the
original action was brought in a federal court. The traditional
rule prevents such inequity and Owen certainly does nothing
to interfere with this practice."'
106. See generally Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977); Babcock & Wilcox
Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970); Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore Inc., 212
F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954).
107. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885).
108. E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 250 U.S. 356 (1921).
109. See Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1886); Gaines v. Dixie Carriers Inc.,
434 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1970); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
ill. The general rule that intervention as of right is ancillary has been qualified
by the exception that a person who is regarded as "indispensable" under FED. R. Civ.
P. 19(b) may not intervene (unless independent grounds of jurisdiction are present).
Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1964). This is some-
what of an anomaly since a FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a) party who is not indispensable may
intervene even though independent grounds of jurisdiction are lacking. Wichita R.R.
& Light v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922). A possible explanation for
this is that if a Rule 19(a) party is found to be indispensable, the action will be
dismissed, but if he is not found to be indispensable, the action will proceed in his
absence and his legal rights may be prejudiced. Thus, in the latter case, ancillary
jurisdiction is necessary to protect legal rights.
Finally, it should be noted that ancillary jurisdiction of an intervenor's claim as of
right is almost wholly a problem of diversity cases. Generally, if a federal question is
involved in the principal claim, the intervenor's claim will also be within federal
question jurisdiction. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1917, at 605-07 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
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H. Interpleader
Interpleader, which is governed by Federal Rule 22(1) '2 and
28 U.S.C. § 1335,113 generally does not present problems of
ancillary jurisdiction and should not, therefore, be affected by
Owen. 114
IV. INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE OF Owen
IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is important not only
in diversity cases such as Owen, but also in cases where the
principal claim is based on a federal question. It can be inferred
that once the Gibbs test is met, following the letter of Owen,
courts will next have to examine each relevant jurisdictional
statute to determine whether Congress has "expressly or by
implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-
federal claim. This could plunge courts into a laborious, time
consuming and generally futile'1 5 examination of legislative in-
tent and statutory history. As a practical matter, this require-
ment could seriously impair judicial economy.
Owen fails to address additional problems in the federal
question area. Those to be discussed in this section include: (1)
What approach should be used in the interpretation of a partic-
ular jurisdictional statute? (2) What should the result be where
the relevant statute is silent on the question of jurisdiction? (3)
What is the relationship between the second and third steps in
the Owen test in federal question cases? and (4) What are the
implications of Owen in pendent and pendent party cases.
A. Interpretive Aids
Several "rules" of statutory interpretation follow from
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
113. (1976).
114. For example, if S of state A sues Cl of state B and C2 of state A, Rule 22(1)
interpleader will not be available since complete diversity is lacking, but, under 28
U.S.C. § 1335 statutory interpleader is proper since it only requires diversity between
the claimants. See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, § 1710, at 397.
115. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 23-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather
than undertake this probing examination, courts may be inclined, as suggested by
several recent cases, to resort to cursory, and often times conclusory, statutory exami-
nations. See, e.g., Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1197-1200
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 50 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1977)
(relevant statute merely mentioned in denying pendent party jurisdiction); Kedra v.
City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (conclusory examination
of statute).
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Owen. Since most jurisdictional statutes do not address non-
federal claims,"6 congressional intent will have to be deter-
mined by examining whether Congress has, by implication,
negated the exercise of jurisdiction. In this vein, "the reach of
the statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed in light
of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial
power has been extended by Congress."' ' 7 By way of example,
in Aldinger it was held that the scope of the cause of action
excluded "counties."11 8 Since the relevent jurisdictional statute
referred only to "persons," it was concluded that Congress had
by implication negated the exercise of pendent party jurisdic-
tion over counties."' It is manifest that this approach will be
difficult to apply.
The second interpretive "rule" has reference to the policy
of strict construction. Zahn, Aldinger and Owen make it clear
that jurisdictional statutes should be strictly and literally con-
strued. A restrictive, and not expansive, interpretation should
apparently be preferred in close cases.
B. Statutory Silence
It should further be noted that Owen poses difficult ques-
tions where the relevant statute is completely silent on the
matter of ancillary jurisdiction. At least two possibilities come
to mind. One view rests on language in Aldinger which suggests
that a court can exercise jurisdiction if Congress has not ex-
pressly, or by implication, negated its exercise: "In . . .Gibbs
Congress was silent on the extent to which the defendant...
might be called upon to answer nonfederal questions or claims;
the way was thus left open for the Court to fashion its own rules
under . . .Art. III.'120
Another possible interpretation is that Congress by its si-
lence has negated the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonfed-
eral claim. The dissent in Aldinger noted that such a conclu-
sion was the logical result of the majority's reasoning: "At one
116. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 23-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 15. This view has found recent judicial support. See, e.g., Transok
Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1977); Ayala v. United States,
550 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1977) (dictum); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F.
Supp. 652, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (where the court, after a very cursory examination, held
that there was nothing in the relevant federal statutes constricting jurisdictional au-
thority to hear the state law claims).
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level of analysis, this test is of course meaningless, being capa-
ble of application to all cases, because all instances of asserted
pendent-party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as
to whom Congress has impliedly 'addressed itself' by not ex-
pressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts."'' This view was followed in Long Prarie Packing Co.
v. Midwest Emery Freight System Inc.'22
While the Long Prarie Packing position seems to be in line
with the axiom that federal courts only have such jurisdiction
as is expressly conferred by statute, 12 it ignores the fact that,
by definition, issues of ancillary jurisdiction only arise when
jurisdiction has not been expressly conferred by Congress. The
former view is also supported by a logical reading of the
Aldinger-Owen language. More specifically, why should a court
delve into the morass of congressional intent merely to find
that which can be inferred, if the second view is followed, from
silence alone? If all instances of statutory silence were con-
strued as a negation of jurisdiction, then the Aldinger and
Owen requirement of statutory examination would be super-
fluous.
C. The Relation of Owen's Second and Third Steps
Owen does not address the question of whether the context
or posture in which the nonfederal question is asserted is al-
ways a consideration. Aldinger would seem to indicate that
there may be some cases where a statutory negation of jurisdic-
tion will be conclusive. 24 Although the Court in that case
touched upon the pendent party context, the implied statutory
negation was ultimately dispositive. Thus, it may be that con-
text will be irrelevent under some jurisdictional statutes.
121. 427 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
122. 429 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1977).
123. It has long been the established rule that federal courts have only such juris-
diction as Congress has expressly conferred by statute. In the leading case of Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922), the rule was stated as follows:
The right of a litigant to maintain an action in a federal court . . . is not
one derived from the Constitution. . .unless in a very indirect sense. Certainly,
it is not a right granted by the Constitution. . . . The effect of these provisions
[Art. I §§ 1, 2] is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the
designated cases and controversies but to delimit those in respect of which
Congress may confer jurisdiction upon such courts as it creates. . . . The Con-
stitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in
the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer it.
Id. at 233-34.
124. 427 U.S. at 16-19.
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D. Pendent and Pendent Parties
Although Owen concerned a question of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, the Court's statements are too clear to be limited only to
such cases; both Owen and Aldinger strongly suggest that there
is no "principled" difference between the rules governing ancil-
lary and pendent jurisdiction. 125 Accordingly, the three part
Owen test should be applicable in cases involving pendent ju-
risdiction.
Following Gibbs, a majority of federal courts expanded the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to include pendent parties. 2
In 1976, in Aldinger v. Howard, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue, holding that:
If the new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject
to federal jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction than if parties already before
the court are required to litigate a state-law claim. Before it
can be concluded that such jurisdiction exists, a federal court
must satisfy itself not only that Art. I permits it, but that
Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not ex-
pressly or by implication negated its existence.' 2
The Court refused, however, "to lay down any sweeping pro-
nouncement upon the existence or exercise of such jurisdic-
tion" 2s and noted that "[o]ther statutory grants and other
alignments of parties and claims might call for a different re-
sult.",29
125. 98 S. Ct. at 2401; 427 U.S. at 13.
126. See, e.g., Schulman v. Huck Finn Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Almen-
ares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971); Leather's Best Inc. v. S.S. Mormacynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Hono Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap Inc., 441 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1971). Under this doctrine, a plaintiff who sues a defendant on a federal
question is permitted to assert a state-law claim (arising out of the same core of facts)
against an entirely new defendant as to whom there is no independent basis of jurisdic-
tion.
127. 427 U.S. at 18.
128. Id.
129. Id. Since Aldinger, several decisions have refused to allow "pendent party"
jurisdiction. Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
98 S. Ct. 50 (1977), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1635 (1978) (the court refused to exercise
"pendent party" jurisdiction even though it had exclusive jurisdiction of the principal
claim); Long Prarie Packing Co. v. Midwest Emery Freight Sys. Inc., 429 F. Supp. 201,
204 (D. Mass. 1977). "Pendent party" jurisdiction was allowed in Transok Pipeline Co.
v. Darks, 564 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1977) (where the federal claim was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts). The court relied on dictum in Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. at 18, which suggests that "pendent party" jurisdiction may be
proper in cases of exclusive jurisdiction over the principal claim.
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Pendent party jurisdiction may have been further limited
by the Court's holding in Owen. It appears that the third step
of the Owen test will rarely, if ever, be sufficient to offset an
express or implied negation of pendent party jurisdiction. Cer-
tainly, if the Court is unwilling to extend jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim against a third party defendant who is
already a party to the action and whose negligence will be
decided in either event, it would seem that even stronger
reasons militate against the exercise of jurisdiction over a
claim against a defendant who is neither a party to the action
nor whose liability is already before the court.30
V. CONCLUSION
The ultimate impact of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger will depend, in large part, on the context in which its
progeny will be litigated. Important, of course, is the question
of whether diversity jurisdiction itself is abolished, as was pro-
posed in the last session of Congress. 131 Certainly much of the
130. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 14. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 713-16 (1973). Pendent party jurisdiction has been invoked to adjudicate the rights
of parties who assert claims for less than $10,000 (but otherwise meet jurisdictional
requirements) when they are joined with parties whose claims meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Thus, where P1 sues D for $11,000 and P2 asserts a claim against
D for only $8,000, a number of courts have allowed "pendent party" jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 817 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968). But see Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939);
Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969). This practice is now highly questionable
in view of the Court's holding in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
This should not be confused with the aggregation of insufficient claims. Tray Bank v.
G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353
(1896). See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, § 1659, at 305-09.
131. Legislation was introduced to abolish diversity jurisdiction but did not clear
the Senate. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H1553-61, 1569-70 (daily
ed. Feb. 28, 1978). The Senate failed to report the bill before the session ended. The
House also attached H.R. 9622 as an amendment to the Magistrate Act of 1978, S.
1613, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H11509-10 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978), but a
conference committee failed to report the bill.
In the report from the Committee on the Judiciary, a number of reasons were
propounded in favor of the adoption of H.R. 9622. First, a major purpose of the bill is
to achieve a balance between the federal and state court systems. The report states
"that Federal law questions are to be adjudicated in the Federal courts . . . and
diversity cases, which invole questions of state law are to be resolved in the state
courts." H.R. REP. No. 893, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). Second, H.R. 9622 was
designed to reduce the federal case load by eliminating some 30,000 diversity cases
annually (25% of the cases filed in 1977) and thus permit the federal courts to concen-
trate on the adjudication of disputes in traditional federal subject matter areas. Id. at
2-5. Finally, the report recognizes that "Federal courts are a scarce resource" which
should not be depleted by giving litigants the luxury of a choice of forum nor allocated
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language of Owen is ambiguous and will require further clarifi-
cation, but as a general proposition the decision presents a
three part analysis. First, it must be determined whether the
federal and nonfederal claims comprise a single constitutional
case. If the nonfederal claim does not arise from the "common
nucleus of operative fact," then the inquiry will be at an end,
since the claim is outside the constitutional limits of jurisdic-
tion. Second, if the constitutional test is met, the relevant stat-
ute must be examined to determine whether Congress has ne-
gated the exercise of jurisdiction. Last, if a statutory negation
is found, then the context in which the nonfederal claim is
asserted must be examined to determine whether it should
permit a circumvention of the negation. Exactly what type of
context will be sufficient to permit circumvention is uncertain.
Also, there may be some cases where context will be irrelevant.
While leaving a number of unresolved questions as to scope and
interpretation, in requiring this three part test, Owen may bur-
den the courts with time consuming examinations of congres-
sional intent and limit, to some extent, the efficiency, economy
and fairness intended to be fostered by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
IGOR POTYM
JUDGES - Immunities - Judicial Act and Jurisdiction
Broadly Defined. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
Since 1871, the Supreme Court has made available a very
broad privilege of immunity to judges of courts of general juris-
diction in civil actions when such actions arise out of judicial
acts not done in the complete absence of jurisdiction.' In the
recent case of Stump v. Sparkman,2 the United States Su-
preme Court again considered the defense of judicial immunity
and, for the first time, offered some definition of what consti-
tutes a judicial act. In this author's view, in putting forward a
broad definition of judicial act, and in reaffirming the use of a
broad construction of jurisdiction in immunity cases, the Court
"to the arduous and ultimately wasteful task of guessing what state law is on issues
upon which only the state court can authoritatively act." Id. at 4-5. The bill has been
reintroduced in the 96th Congress. H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
2. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
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